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Courage – despite millennia of contemplation – is only now seeing efforts at empirical 
study and definition. Recent studies have attempted to break down the component parts 
of courage, but do not address why courage appears to only be bestowed on others and 
rarely to oneself: a phenomenon known as courage blindness (Biswas-Deiner, 2012). 
This paper examines how individuals attribute courage to themselves and how they 
attribute it to others. Male military personnel (n =86) and male college students (n =106) 
read 14 scenarios of varying courage, rating the courageousness of themselves or another 
person based on the action. Multiple ANOVAs were conducted for scenario courage 
ratings based on attribution perspective, military involvement, courage type, risk level, 
and nobility level; correlations with humility, locus of control and social desirability were 
also conducted. Results showed increased courage ratings when reporting for others 
rather than self, and lower ratings by military servicemen as compared to civilians. This 
indicates support for a courage blindness effect as well as a professional attitude 
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Call it Courage: The Effects of Perspective on Perceptions of Courage  
 
  On June 30th, 2011, Nazar Melis risked her life to save a two year old boy from a 
burning house (Parsons & Blunden, 2011).  While driving by a house up in flames Melis 
heard a mother screaming. She parked her car, ran into the building and grabbed the child 
with no thought for her own personal safety. But Melis slipped away soon after, and the 
family and bystanders were left wondering who exactly this mystery woman was and 
clamored for a commendation or at least some kind of recognition for her bravery. After a 
few days she was identified, and when asked about her courageous act, she claimed that 
she “didn't really think for a second - I just ran in there, got the baby and ran back out” 
(Parsons & Blunden, 2011) This act of courage serves as an excellent example, and 
exhibits some key behaviors of both the actors and observers of courageous acts. 
Courage is a noble virtue, one particularly celebrated on the battlefield or in times 
of moral crisis (Rorty, 1988). Why, then, does it seem that those labeled as courageous 
either downplay or do not wish to call attention to those acts? Anecdotal accounts suggest 
that people readily label others as courageous, but rarely do the same for themselves. 
United States Air Force Staff Sgt. Salvatore Giunta, a recent Medal of Honor recipient 
who risked his own life to save a fellow soldier from being taken captive by Taliban 
militants, follows this notion. In a 2010 interview, Giunta reveals that “everything kind of 
slowed down and [he] did everything [he] thought [he] could do, nothing more and 
nothing less (Shane & Harris, 2010). He also gives credit to his comrades: “I wasn’t the 
only one there that night. They were all doing their jobs. As we’re talking right now, 
there are people deployed, fighting for their nation. This dismissal of incredible behavior 
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is referred to as courage-blindness (Biswas-Deiner, 2012). But why might people do this? 
This question has gone unanswered, but there are some possibilities for its occurrence. It 
could be an element of humility involved in courage and a potentially false or insincere 
version at that. There could be an inherent difference between calling oneself and naming 
others courageous, where “people often see their own actions as so unavoidable, so 
natural, so correct, that they miss the basic fact that their actions are extraordinary” 
(Biswas-Deiner, 2010). A final possible explanation appears to lie in the attributional 
nature of accolade courage. 
Despite its consideration by philosophers for thousands of years, courage has only 
recently begun to see empirical validation and structured study. In this renewed 
exploratory stage of research, psychologists now delve into the fundamental aspects of 
courage. Some, like Norton and Weiss (2009) consider courage in sparse, behavioral 
terms: overcoming one’s fears. However, this view seems inadequate. Simply 
overcoming fear alone cannot adequately explain why courage is considered a virtue. 
What is the rationale behind overcoming that fear? What motivations are there for 
ignoring or surpassing inhibition? It seems that overcoming one’s fear cannot by itself 
define courage, but rather reduces it to something less valuable socially, such as risk-
taking.  One study by Muris (2009), found a high correlation between a children’s version 
of the Norton & Weiss scale and sensation seeking. This study revealed that when 
courage is defined with only standing up to fear, courage is more directly related to risk-
taking. But risk is not the only component of courage. 
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Rate, Clarke, Lindsay, and Sternberg (2007), in an attempt to understand the 
general definitional conception of courage, conducted a study to ascertain the 
fundamental parts which make up courage. A sample composed of both Air Force 
Academy cadets and Yale undergraduates revealed participants’ own definitions, when 
compared to one another and ranked, fell into distinct dimensions. Their 
operationalization of courage sometimes includes fear, but also considers intentionality, 
risk, and noble purpose as requisites for courage. This definition indicates that there is 
more to courage than simply overcoming fear, as suggested by the behaviorist viewpoint. 
An individual might be afraid of snakes, but if that individual is offered a thousand 
dollars to hold a snake despite his fear, the element of courage suddenly diminishes. 
Similarly, the fellows on MTV’s Jackass are admittedly performing risky actions, but 
they seem to be less noble and falling short of the label of courageous. For an act to be 
labeled as courageous, the actor must have some meaningful purpose in mind.  
Courage can take many forms, so it is important to determine whether it should be 
operationalized as a course of action which people use in their own daily lives for 
overcoming hazards or as a rare and celebrated occurrence. Pury and Starkey (2010) 
described these two views as processes and accolades respectively. Put more simply, 
process courage is overcoming a personal sense of risk or discomfort while accolade 
courage is the attribution of the label “courage” to an action taken by the self or, more 
commonly, by others. The Pury and Starkey analysis of the 2007 Rate et al. study 
recognized the participant-derived definition as best representing the accolade model. 
One reason for this separation is that courage as an accolade calls into question the role of 
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fear. Rate et al. (2007) suggest that fear may or may not be necessary for describing or 
recognizing courage, and a later study by Rate (2010) removes this element from the 
definitional requirements entirely. McGurk and Castro (2010) propose that courage is not 
dependent on fear or the lack thereof, in the specific context of the battlefield during war. 
Rather, it is being aware of the situation and reacting despite unfavorable or potentially 
dangerous knowledge.   Courage as a process, particularly when considered in the context 
of psychotherapy, almost requires that fear be present. When Norton and Weiss (2009) 
asked undergrads to face their fear of spiders, they measured success in terms of 
overcoming fear. The process of being courageous for their participants involved facing 
and conquering their distress, but it seems lacking when contemplating exemplary acts of 
bravery.  
The accolade conception of courage embraces these infrequent, extreme acts. The 
rarity of accolade courage gives insight into how individuals perform exceptionally, and 
how the world exalts these rare actions. Oftentimes, these acts of courage are recognized 
and rewarded. Many commendations and awards for courage all have similar criteria 
(e.g., Lifesavers Award, Royal Humane Society, 2008; Anne Frank Award for Moral 
Courage, Anne Frank Awards, 2011; Godfrey Philips Bravery Award, Godfrey Philips, 
2011). For example, the Lifesavers Award considers “degree of risk, duration of risk, 
choice to act, persistence, advance warning, and impact of physical surroundings” and the 
Anne Frank Award for Moral Courage looks for “people who have used respect, 
integrity, responsibility or a commitment to social justice to really change things for the 
better” along with “determination to stand up for what is right”. The idea that courage is 
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an accolade is closely tied with the celebration of courageous acts. When courage is 
praised, society indicates that something good or beneficial has occurred, and similar acts 
would be welcomed. With regard to Norton and Weiss (2009) on individual levels, 
overcoming disproportionate or irrational fears certainly has merit, but from a societal 
and moral standpoint, that conception of courage does not seem quite so worthy of praise. 
The admiration of things good implies a moral component to courage; judgment and 
celebration of bravery result from the act being worthy of praise. It also adds a scale 
component: smaller acts of courage seem to be less noteworthy. 
A qualitative analysis of Carnegie Medal recipients – awarded for altruistic, civilian 
heroism – indicates that the reasons many courageous actors give for their deeds are 
socially based and not based on overcoming fear (Oliner, 2009). That someone might 
enter a burning building for the sake of overcoming fear seems foolish at best. These 
heroics can easily be labeled as courageous if only overcoming fear is considered and 
point to the inadequacy of the Norton and Weiss definition. Seventy-eight percent of 
those interviewed cited learned beliefs and values as a driving force behind their actions, 
while 66 percent mentioned social responsibility. In the heat of the moment, these heroes 
did not consider their own fear but rather their responsibility to their fellow man and the 
ethical guidelines by which they had been brought up. Those in professions of service 
and safety must acknowledge this every day.  
For many professions, courage is an integral component. Service and protection 
oriented occupations, such as police officers, firefighters, and members of the armed 
forces recognize that they may be called upon to rush into danger at a moment’s notice. 
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Diving deeper into the elements of accolade courage will grant a deeper understanding of 
the virtue of courage, and hopefully explain why the courageous dismiss while society 
celebrates. It can help explain why Giunta and Melis don’t consider themselves heroes, 
but rather only as people doing their duty or what felt right. At the same time, the desire 




 Originally a philosophical undertaking, the concept of courage was first studied in 
depth by Aristotle (trans. 1985) and his writings on virtue ethics. In an analysis of 
Aristotle’s ideas, Daniel Putman (2010) makes an excellent case for considerations of 
courage and its qualities as it was first understood.  For the ancient Greeks, courage fell 
between two extremes: rashness and cowardice. The happy medium of these two actions 
is courage. Where a coward would run away from or avoid menace, a courageous person 
would not. Rashness does involve facing danger, but in a foolhardy and careless way. To 
act out in either extreme would be considered a vice. Courage falls between both of these 
poles: facing fear for the right reasons, which is a vague definition at best. Aristotle also 
wrote of acts that look courageous, but are not. These erroneous acts have confounds of 
overconfidence, instinct, fear, and ignorance. If courage can be faked or misconstrued in 
these fashions, then certainly there is some merit in uncovering and presenting a model of 
courage (Rate, 2010). 
 Much of the focus on courage since Aristotle’s definition has been extremely 
directed onto acts of overcoming physical danger for some kind of noble goal (Putman, 
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2010) such as running into a burning house to grab a child, diving on a grenade to save 
comrades, or jumping into a flooded river to assist a drowning victim. Yet courage is not 
defined strictly by bodily acts of valor (Putman, 2010; Rate, 2010).  
While the previous examples exude physical courage, contemporary courage 
research has provided some other brands of courage. Moral courage is standing up for 
what is right, despite possible social condemnation (Lopez, O’Bryne, & Peterson, 2003). 
Acts of moral courage can take great audacity, though they may be more passive in 
nature. Rosa Parks’ refusal of her bus seat as a symbol of civil disobedience is a prime 
example of moral courage: by sitting down she stood up for herself, despite great 
physical and social risk. Another more recently defined type of courage is psychological 
courage, or possessing mental fortitude when confronted with physical and/or mental 
illness (Putman, 2010). From an accolade perspective, this determination of what is right 
is made by the observer, rather than the actor though the two may not necessarily be 
different in their determinations. It is the observer who bestows awards and recognition, 
and it is the observer who either ostracizes or celebrates an act against injustice.  
 Some process courage research places an emphasis on fear and one’s reaction to 
it. This distinction from accolade courage is important to note. The Norton and Weiss 
study (2009) is one such example of considering only fear and the behavioral response to 
threatening stimuli. Rachman’s 1990 book on fear and courage directly addresses courage 
in only two of its chapters, and then only as a model where the behavioral component of 
fear is not present.  A World War Two study on United States Air Force pilots focused on 
the role of fear during combat missions, but did note some determinates of courage: 
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confidence, morale, keeping busy and social stimulation (Shaffer, 1947). The problem 
with considering only fear is that it reduces the notion of courage to nothing more than a 
form of risk-taking, where one does something they fear because it will be good for them. 
However, it is much easier to collect biophysical data on fear. There are clear physical 
responses to stressful stimuli (Lang, 1978; Rachman, 1990; Tsigos & Chrousos, 2002), 
and while limiting the effects of fear is certainly an admirable and effective goal, it does 
nothing to explain the cognitive processes by which people “decide” to be courageous. 
This decision making process fits well into the freely chosen intentionality component of 
Rate’s model (2010) as acts of courage by definition are performed with purpose and 
intent, but do not require fear.  
Courage is obviously present in society and has been noted for thousands of years, 
as made evident by Aristotle, but the origins and causes of courage blindness have yet to 
be fully addressed. Courage serves well as an example of moral goodness, so from where 
does this apparent discrepancy between people’s own account of their courageous action 
and the assessment of others come?  Five possible mechanisms are proposed to play some 
part in these differences. (1) The nature of courage as an accolade. (2) Varying locus of 
control. (3) The distinction between actors and observers and its inherent bias. (4) The 
influence of humility and social desirability. (5) Involvement in a professional culture 
such as the military.  
The nature of courage as an accolade points to a process of socially beneficial 
behavior serving as an example to others. By rewarding those who act valiantly, the 
behavior is encouraged. But because the actor puts himself at risk while observers and 
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those awarding citations of bravery do not, there appears to be fundamental difference 
between a self-induced courage-blindness and the courage-focus of observers. Because of 
the inherent risk of courageous acts, encouraging individuals to perform them is good for 
the society, but potentially dangerous for the individual. As a result, the individual may 
seek to downplay the act to avoid considering the danger he escaped. The attribution of 
courage from others can only include what is seen, heard and felt, but does not include 
the subjective experience of performing the act itself. Additionally, there might be 
discrepancies on the value of the goal between actor and observer, leading to inflation on 
behalf of the latter. Pury and Kowalski (2007) found that many of the attributes 
associated with courage (e.g. vitality, leadership) were associated more so with a general 
courage – an act which would be courageous for any person – rather than personalized 
accounts of courage. This would suggest a relationship between those acting and those 
watching, the former coupled with personalized accounts and the latter with general 
courage. An intense goal-focus, as is required by courageous actors, may lessen 
awareness of the risk at hand. Downplay could result from a desire to acknowledge the 
lack of intense feelings of fear or risk because. There could also likely be elements of 
humility and social desirability present, where an accurate self-perception or craving for 
approval might influence perception of courage. Finally, the nature of one’s work culture 
might also influence how the individual and outsiders qualify courageous acts, 
particularly if courageous acts are expected by that profession.  
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The nature of courage as an accolade must first be explored to understand why 
these differences exist, in terms of attributing courage, humility, and expectations of 
certain professions.  
Courage as an Accolade 
Morality shares much in common among different parts of the world; it appears to 
have some fundamental similarities between peoples. Moral Foundation Theory (Haidt, 
2005) looks at five fundamental moral values shared between cultures. These values are 
care, fairness, loyalty, respect, and purity. Because all cultures share these values to an 
extent, there appears to be some common denominator of morality. This commonality is 
important, because it indicates that there is a natural inclination that different peoples 
share. Different values may be more or less important to certain cultures and religions (or 
even political denominations, see Haidt & Graham, 2007) but these five values are 
fundamentally incorporated in all cultures. For example, most cultures consider 
unprovoked and thoughtless killing of individuals a crime; there is something inherently 
wrong about murder that is recognized by all societies. Yet, saving lives appears to be 
universally celebrated, as are the values of courage (Dahlsgaard, Peterson, & Seligman, 
2005; Rorty, 1988). The accolade approach to courage includes the socialization process 
as it takes place. When people hear of or witness a courageous act, these behaviors are 
encouraged because they have been deemed admirable and desirable.  
According to Pury and Starkey (2010) the accolade model of courage, “looks at 
courage from the outside in…directs us to study rare and extreme acts … [and] studies 
the behavior of praising an action” (p. 85). It is the rare and notable deeds which garner 
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the most attention, as they further inspire action themselves. When these acts are 
celebrated, there is intent to inspire others to do the same, because society has deemed 
there is value in that type of behavior. However, simply going out seeking courageous 
opportunities, or even creating them oneself serves to deteriorate the noble goal necessary 
for courage; consider a person who starts a large fire and lets it burn solely so that he 
might put it out later to be celebrated as a hero. As a result, the act must also be 
seemingly organic. Because of this need for a natural occurring act instead of a 
manufactured one, awards typically have several requirements which must be met before 
they can be distributed (Lifesavers Award, Royal Humane Society, 2008; Anne Frank 
Award for Moral Courage, Anne Frank Awards, 2011, etc;). For example, the United 
States Medal of Honor is awarded for “Conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk 
of his or her life above and beyond the call of duty while engaged in an action against any 
enemy of the United States;” and rarely at that (Congressional Medal of Honor Society, 
2011). It is the highest military decoration in the United States Armed Forces, the only 
accolade worn around the neck and bestowed by the President of the United States. With 
so much pomp and recognition, it is clear that battlefield courage is desired. The honor 
associated with the accolade is made even more so by the likelihood of a posthumous 
award; more than half of the medal winners have died during the events which won them 
accolades since 1941 (Pullen, 1997).  
The nature of accolades ties into the moral sensibilities of a community, and 
society wants and needs courageous actors. Because of this moral imperative, courageous 
action serves as a beacon and example for others, but that only addresses an altruistic 
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notion on the part of the actors. It acknowledges that the public sees, understands, and 
praises acts of bravery. It does not explain how that process comes about. Courage’s 
accolade nature is crucial for identifying the noble causes and social aspects of courage, 
but is also useful for examining how others assess and ascribe worth to a courageous 
actor. Award givers and witnesses see worth in praising the courageous, but are unable to 
read minds. Somehow, they must attribute acts and characteristics to those they see 
perform great acts of bravery. 
Actor Observer Bias 
Because an individual can only know with certainty what they themselves were 
thinking, it is important to understand how others assume causes to both events and the 
behaviors of others. First published by Fritz Heider (1958), the theory of attribution 
concerns this very issue. That people must use their own observations and perceptions to 
determine the rationale behind the behaviors of others assures that only guesses can be 
made. Still, the explanatory attribution makes an attempt to explain the thought processes 
behind attributing intent to a particular act. It does so by separating the explanations of 
behaviors into two separate categories of internal and external attributions. Internal, or 
personal, attributions are derived from the conception of the target’s characteristics, 
abilities and moods. For example, the person might do something because they are kind, 
skilled, depressed or so forth. External, or situational, attributions assume that a cause 
stems from the environment or the task itself. These attributions have less to do with the 
person involved than the situation in which the person is involved. Even if people can 
only make inferences about why someone acted in a particular way, they still have the 
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power to deem someone courageous or not.  There is a difference between a courageous 
act and a courageous actor (Rachman, 2010). The act itself can be performed by any 
person in a given situation provided they are present; a courageous actor is one who acts 
courageously in multiple situations on a regular basis, as in the case of firefighters. In 
observing and contemplating the reasons for a courageous act, the observer can decide 
whether or not courage was present, citing both internal and external reasons. At the same 
time, in the mind of a courageous actor, the scenario may have played out differently, and 
they may not consider themselves courageous. Possibly, they may focus more on the 
external factors of the situation at hand as Oliner’s (2009) interviews suggested, than 
their own abilities or disposition. That courageous actors often perform courageous acts 
might also dull their sensitivity to the act; for them it is rote. However, others do not 
make the distinction between act and actor, calling firefighters, police, and soldiers 
heroes at every opportunity.  
  Correspondent interference theory (Jones & Davis, 1967) examines how people 
make attributions of intent solely about the person involved, and attempts to understand 
whether the effects of an action were intended. In order to consider an action intentional, 
three requirements must be met. The actor must be aware of the consequences of the 
action, possess the ability to perform the action, and intend to perform the action, and 
these components must be assessed by the observer. There is both a notion of “I’m 
thinking what you’re thinking”, as well as a tendency to misattribute the intention. 
Intentionality is a key part of Rate’s (2010) model of courage, and Jones and Davis 
suggest a compatible model of other-based perception of intentionality. The goal of 
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correspondent inference theory is to account for how perceivers infer from an action they 
observed; in the case of a courageous act, it could be used to decipher all three of Rate’s 
requirements. A witness easily could make assessments based on whether or not the 
cause was noble or noteworthy and see the risk involved but intentionality would require 
additional assessment as outlined above. If a bystander sees the courageous act through to 
completion, then the observer can say with certainty that the actor had the required ability 
and intent. If a courageous actor is unaware of the consequences of the action, then he 
lacks intentionality, but this judgment the witness must make alone. 
Because attributions made can only be based on one’s own perception, the 
position a scenario is witnessed from is incredibly important. It stands to reason that there 
will be a difference in how first and third person observers might react to the same event, 
as they cannot share the same perceptions. For those directly involved in a courageous 
act, the event is personal and risky. The actor could have an emphasis on the external 
situation, claiming that it was simply the situation he was thrust into that resulted in his 
actions. For those who are indirectly witnessing the act, it is a moral exemplar worthy of 
praise. Because courage is celebrated, the attribution would focus on the internal 
attributes of the actor, despite having no insight into the actor’s mind. 
Because of the distinct differences in mental perspective for actors and observers, 
there is likely to be some kind effect of perspective on ratings of courage which can help 
explain the courage blindness problem. One explanation for this was Jones and Nisbett’s 
(1971) actor/observer asymmetry theory, which suggested each role would have a 
different explanation for a particular scenario. Actors tend to provide a situational 
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explanation, while observers would propose it was because of the actor’s character traits. 
A meta-analysis by Malle (2006) showed that there was no distinct separation of 
attributions by these parameters for intended or rote behaviors, and that the traditional 
dichotomy of situational and dispositional explanations is potentially fatally flawed. 
However, this only refers to behaviors and typical situations. Idiosyncratic behaviors and 
exceptional situations could still be subject to this formulation (Malle, 2006) which 
would include acts of great courage.  
The essence of the Actor/Observer asymmetry is the distinct and separate 
perceptions and reactions of the actors and observers. Accolade courage can be affected 
by this dichotomy because by its nature it requires extraordinary acts. From the 
courageous actor perspective, courage ratings should decrease because what the act 
means about themselves or what they thought at the time is less important to those 
individuals. The actor did what the situation demanded. From the observing, external 
angle, courage ratings should be increased, because there is social advantage to 
celebrating courage. Furthermore, their perspective does not allow insight into the actor’s 
mind, so they might attribute more courage than the actor might have felt. The observer 
sees an extraordinary person. Neither the actor nor observer is correct, but rather each 
sees from his own perspective and responds to inquiries from this mindset. 
How an individual perceives their own control over their life may also be an 
important factor. The concept of locus of control (Rotter, 1966) looks at how people 
interpret events that occur. An individual with a high internal locus of control believes 
that they have power over things that happen to them. For example, a poor test score 
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would be a result of poor preparation for that test. The end result is attributable to 
something that they have control over, that is, their study habits. An individual with an 
external locus of control believes that outside influences, such as the environment or 
chance, control events. These individuals would blame their poor test score on the teacher 
or questions being too difficult. This is important to consider, as locus of control might 
affect how individuals consider a situation requiring courage. An individual with high 
internal locus of control may view a courageous individual as acting of their own volition 
and against their better self-interest. An external locus might consider a courageous act 
solely as being in the right place at the right time, or being destined for the act, thereby 
downplaying its value. For this reason, it is suggested that those with an internal locus of 
control will more easily identify with courageous acts, and in turn rate them higher.  
H1: Compared to other-attributional focus, scenarios with self-attributional focus 
will have decreased ratings of courage. 
H2: Participants with greater internal locus of control will have higher ratings of 
courage. 
Humility 
 Like courage, humility is also a celebrated but scarcely researched virtue. This 
similarity seems to arise from not from scarcity, as momentous acts of accolade courage 
often are, but rather a lack of consensus on what it means to be humble and the 
difficulties inherent to measuring humility (Kachorek et al., 2004; Tangney, 2000). 
Humility embodies a wide range of difficult to capture behaviors, and has several 
different definitions, including negative perspectives. Tangney (2000) challenged the 
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negative associations paired with the term – namely weakness, passivity, humiliation, and 
shame – and presented a coherent view of humility which espouses it as a virtue. 
Humility, like courage, falls between two extreme poles: those of narcissism and self-
loathing. Tangney’s support for virtue status focuses first on what humility is not – it is 
not narcissism, arrogance, low self-esteem, or intentional underestimation – and the 
indirect evidence for its psychological, social, and physical benefits. 
Tangney’s 2000 review of the humility literature listed the key components of 
humility. These components include: an accurate sense of one’s abilities (not underrated); 
ability to acknowledge shortcomings, mistakes, and ignorance; openness; keeping 
abilities in perspective; a lower focus on self; and wide appreciation for all things and all 
contributions. Other-focused behavior and accurate self-assessment seem to be involved 
with the downplaying of risk inherent to courageous acts; wide appreciation and diverted 
self-focus may also contribute to the noble cause involved in courage, as well as provide 
a reason of intent. Furthermore, because so many situations of courage involve scarce or 
uncommon behaviors, perhaps the accurate sense of ability is used to prevent dwelling on 
the risk that was involved. It is also possible that knowing one’s own aptitude provided 
the rationale for acting in the first place (e.g. I am capable of acting, therefore I must act). 
Kachorek et al. (2004) stress the importance of the willingness toward accurate self-
assessment and proper perspective of one’s own ability. Others suggest that humility 
involves a world view beyond the self, a broader perspective (Murray, 2001; Tangney, 
2000). Humble individuals recognize that they are relatively insignificant in a grand 
scheme or compared to a higher power, and this pairs well with the Oliner (2009) 
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interviews which revealed significant percentages of courageous actors attributing their 
behaviors to higher callings, either religious or humanitarian.  
Humility researchers have had difficulty establishing scales which adequately 
measure humility while meeting acceptable levels of validity or reliability (Exline, 2008; 
Tangney, 2000). The lack of a consensus definition and difficulty measuring this social 
concept has hindered its operationalization. For one, self-report techniques tend to result 
in low internal consistency because there are diverging opinions about what humility 
actually means in the population. Tangney suggests that humility should not be 
shoehorned into a single dimension, particularly because it is so often defined as being 
the absence of an action. Social desirability is another issue with this type of measure. 
The idea of measuring a humble person brings up an interesting paradox. How can a 
humble person accurately respond that he or she is humble? The humility will manifest 
itself as rating oneself lower than they truly are, thereby bring their score down lower 
than is actual. Landrum’s (2002) study proposes that there is a positive correlation 
between self-reported humility and social desirability. The other issue involves non-
humble people rating themselves much higher than is actually the case. Furthermore, in 
issues of morality, people tend to talk themselves up (Allison, Messick, & Goethals, 
1989). As humility is a moral issue, there could easily be some upward skewing when 
asking participants to report this virtue.  
  Despite these difficulties, a recently published 32-item humility self-report scale 
(Elliot, 2010) has shown promising results. The scale attempts to separate humility into 
as many component parts as possible. These scale sections include: openness, self-
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forgetfulness, modest self-assessment, and focus on others. By looking at the different 
pieces which make up humility, the scale enhances its divergent validity and increases its 
internal consistency between scale items.  
People tend to talk themselves up, rather than be self-deprecating (Myers, 2000; 
Taylor & Brown, 1988) and also self-enhance in moral domains more often than 
intellectual domains (Allison, Messick, & Goethals, 1989). Why then does it appear the 
courageous balk at acknowledgment of their desirable deed? Humility and courage 
intuitively appear to be related in more significant ways than being virtues. The limited 
acknowledgment of one’s own courageous acts may be tied to humility, while observers 
have no problem bestowing lavish praise on others for bravery. Humility’s accurate self-
assessment may account for the dismissal of accomplishments performed by courageous 
actors. 
H3: Humility will be positively correlated with courage self-ratings. 
H4: Social desirability will be positively correlated with courage self-ratings. 
H5: Social desirability will be positively correlated with the distance between self 
 and other ratings. 
Professional Expectations  
Franco, Blau and Zimbardo (2011) propose two distinctions regarding heroism, 
separating out heroic acts involving physical peril and social acts of sacrifice. These are 
similar to the concepts of physical and civil/psychological courage respectively. The 
authors also seek to further distinguish the physically dangerous heroic acts by separating 
out those specialized courageous actors who are required by their code and profession to 
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face risk from those everyday folk who are thrust into extraordinary situations. It is these 
“duty-bound, physical risk heroes” (p. 100) and the professional communities from which 
they come – the military, police, and firefighters, for example – which account for a large 
part of the notion of courage.  
In a professional culture such as the military, which places great emphasis on 
honor and is typically held in high esteem by the public, there is an expectation for 
certain types of behavior. That is to say, those in the military are supposed to be 
courageous by the very nature of the job, and the organization purports that value 
(Wynne, 2006). An average citizen will see the noble cause of the armed forces and the 
risks they undertake as exceptional. As such, there should be an expectation from those 
outside the organization of great courage which could manifest itself as celebratory. 
Meanwhile, those inside the organization are held to the expectation of courage and 
become desensitized to it. For them, it is simply “all in a day’s work”. This could result in 
lowered ratings of courage for themselves. At the same time, military members are 
familiar with what courage requires and should readily be able to recognize it in others. 
They could be considered “experts” in courage, potentially leading to increased 
acknowledgment of courageous action by others.  
Soldiers are also required to focus intensely on their goals, because of the high 
cost of failure. This focus could negate the effects of fear. Kruglanksi et al’s (2002) Goal 
Systems Theory proposes that, in general, actors have two types of goals in mind when 
undertaking action: prevention goals, where the actor seeks to prevent something from 
happening and promotion goals where the actor works to make something happen. Most 
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physical and courageous acts appear to be prevention oriented goals – to prevent 
something bad from happening (Pury et al., 2007). As more attention is paid to the noble 
goal, fear and anxiety would receive less mental attention. After a successful courageous 
action, the actor could remember back to the event and recall only their focus but not any 
fear. Anecdotal evidence suggests (Oliner, 2009) that in putting all but the goal out of the 
mind, the actor could consider himself as having instinctively acted or “just doing what 
anyone would do.” Of course, this is not true as courage requires exceptional actions, but 
this phenomenon could also account for lower self-ratings of courage if courageous 
actors do not remember enough to acknowledge their feats. Finally, it is proposed that 
military service will increase understanding of courage, making it easier for military 
members to discern and report courage acted upon by others. 
H6a: Military service will decrease self-ratings of courage. 
H6b: Military service will increase other-ratings of courage. 
Napoleon cynically claimed that “a soldier will fight long and hard for a bit of 
colored ribbon” suggesting that these accolades are ultimately meaningless. Yet, often the 
soldier does not claim to have been seeking a ribbon or reward, nor are these brave acts 
limited to the battlefield. Drowning people live, bullies are stood up to, and social wrongs 
are righted. Are these courage accolades simply to improve fighting ability, or do they 
mean something more? 
Courage has been difficult to shape into a cohesive model, despite being a desired 
social action. This is because its very nature makes courageous behaviors rare, at least 
those which draw accolade attention from others. Obviously participants cannot be forced 
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into dangerous situations for sake of measuring and examining their reactions, but by 
having individuals contemplate the nature of courage and mentally placing themselves 
into these situations, we discover why people see courage as so admirable in others, but 
prefer not to crown themselves with glory. If there is a cultural reason for celebrating acts 
of courage, and there is a distinction between praising others and avoiding praise for 
oneself then looking more closely at how people understand courage will reveal it.  
Method 
Participants 
Research participants came from both military and civilian student backgrounds. 
Military enlisted and officer personnel from various Clemson area recruiting stations, 
Clemson Veteran’s group members, and senior ROTC cadets made up the military 
sample (n=86). To assist in protecting anonymity, an age range was used for these 
participants rather than exact values. As can be seen in Figure 1, the plurality of military 
participants was between ages 18 and 24. The civilian sample consisted of Clemson 
University students from the psychology pool (n=106; mean age=19.7). A power analysis 
for multiple analyes of variance (ANOVAs), based on an α of .05, a 1 – β of .8, and an 
estimated effect size of .25, determined that the study requires 179 participants. Power 
analyses for point-biserial correlations based on the same parameters require 95 
participants. 
Because of gender difference concerns, only male participants were used in this 
study. Were both men and women to provide data, there would have been trouble 
separating out how individuals would perceive the characters between the character 
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scenarios and the imagine-self scenarios. Scenarios had only male protagonists. 
Furthermore, this helped minimize the number of experimental factors, simplifying data 
collection and analysis. This does raise questions of whether men or women receive 
higher ratings by virtue of the actor being a man or women (i.e. are men in general 
considered to be more courageous, simply because they are men?), this approach will 
allow for consistency and a simpler analysis.  
 Both the military and civilian samples were predominantly white. The military 
sample consisted of 87% white participants, while the civilian sample consisted of 82% 
white participants. The civilian sample, due to its restriction to college participants, had a 
consistent educational level of some college for nearly all participants. Only one civilian 
participant had a Master’s degree. The military sample was more varied: 58.1% of the 
sample had at least a college degree, with 24.4% having obtained a Master’s degree in 
some field. The student sample had only one participant with prior military experience; 
his data was moved to the military sample and he was included in the n of 86 for that 
sample. Military rank was split fairly evenly. 47.1% of respondents were cadets or 
enlisted. The remaining 52.9% were officers. More demographic information on the 
military sample can be seen in Table 1. 
Design 
Scenarios were based off of three courage types (physical, moral, and 
psychological), two attribution focuses (self and other), two nobility levels (high and 
low), and two risk levels (high and low) between two sample groups (student and 
military). Four scenarios of each type were created, to look for any potential differences 
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between these courage types. Because accolade courage is most typically associated with 
physical courage, an extra scenario for both the high nobility/high risk and low 
nobility/low risk condition was added, bringing the total number of scenarios to 14. 
Scenarios were then altered to fit into the attribution focus. Self-scenarios used first-
person perspective and ask the participant to imagine themselves in the situation; other-
scenarios used third-person perspective with male protagonists.  The same 28 scenarios 
were used in both the student and military populations. Participants were randomly 
assigned either the self or other condition for each scenario as they progressed through 
the survey. This process was not perfect due to the surveying software; as a result, the 
number of responses to each survey varied slightly from scenario to scenario. Reported 
degrees of freedom in the Results section will reflect these differences. Additionally, the 
scenario orders were randomized to help mitigate priming effects. Table 2 shows each of 
these scenario factors. 
Materials  
 
  First, demographic data was collected from the participants. The demographic 
questionnaire (Appendix A) included basic questions concerning age, ethnicity, and 
educational level. It also addressed the question of previous employment in professions 
which require physical courage, such as the military, law enforcement, and fire-fighting. 
Time spent in these professions, as well as time spent deployed and rank achieved was 
also requested. 
Because there are no previous methods of measuring the effect of attribution on 
courage, stories of courage were created. Scenarios are varied across types of courage 
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(Putnam, 2010), degree of risk (Rate, 2010), and nobility (Rate, 2010) to allow for a wide 
range of the different aspects of courage. These stories are to be considered from both a 
self and other perspective to assess potential actor/observer bias while assessing the 
multiple combinations of risk, nobility, and type. Questions regarding risk, meaning and 
goodness were also included to look at the component parts of courage as established by 
Rate (2010). This was done to ensure consistency between the scenarios (e.g. high risk 
scenarios should see higher risk ratings) and potentially reveal differences between the 
two sample groups.  
Additionally, Elliot’s 2010 humility scale was used to measure the relative 
differences in humility between participants. This scale has 32 items and incorporates a 
number of different elements. Although it is new and has little outside replication, 
Elliot’s scale shows particularly good reliability for humility, which has a history of 
being difficult to assess (Tangney, 2000). Elliot (2010) reported a Cronbach’s alpha of 
.842. This measure allows examination of whether a link between humble self-
assessment and how that person attributes courage to others exists. Elliot separated items 
into four factors: openness (α=.60), self-forgetfulness (α=.64), modest self-assessment 
(α=.63), and focus on others (α=.37).  While these factors are on the low end, the 
nebulous nature of humility makes the first three acceptable. The focus-on-others factor 
is low, but it was also most consistently associated with related factors. All four 
categories were shown to be distinct from other similar measures of empathy, 
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 Crowne and Marlowe’s social desirability scale (1960) was used to measure the 
degree to which people desire to please others in social situations. High scores reflect a 
greater emphasis for a participant wishing to achieve social goals such as wanting others 
to like them. This scale is included to ensure that participants are not giving favorable 
answers solely to portray themselves positively. Internal consistency was rated at .88 
(Crowne & Marlowe, 1960), while test-retest reliability was acceptable at .86 (Crino, 
Svoboda, Rubenfeld, & White, 1983).  
Rotter’s (1966) locus of control scale was used to measure participants’ feelings 
of control over events that affect them. High scores reflect an external locus, meaning 
that outside forces do more to affect events than anything they can do themselves. Low 
scores reflect an internal locus. These individuals believe that events occur because of 
their own behavior and that they can impact events that include them. Internal 
consistency of the scale was acceptable, calculated at .79 (Spector, 1988). Test-retest 
reliability of the scale was found to be adequate at .83 (Rotter, 1966). 
Procedure 
Participants were asked to both read about other people in and imagine 
themselves in various scenarios of courage (Appendix B), and then answer a series of 
questions (Appendix C) regarding how courageous they think the actor was and why. The 
shift in perspective allowed for different attributional approaches of internal and external 
assessments. Both perspectives were randomly assigned throughout the survey, so as not 
to prime the participant to thinking about courage in one respect or another. Participants 
also took Elliot’s (2010) humility scale (Appendix D), Crowne and Marlowe’s (1960) 
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social desirability scale (Appendix E) and Rotter’s (1966) locus of control scale 
(Appendix F). Sample items for Elliot’s scale include: “When I get in trouble, it is 
important to me to be able to explain what happened” (openness), “It frustrates me, when 
others are praised and I am not” (self-forgetfulness), “I often wish I were as talented as 
my peers” (modest self-assessment), and “I am deeply touched when others sacrifice for 
me” (focus on others).  “I never hesitate to go out of my way to help someone in trouble” is 
a sample item from Crowne and Marlowe’s scale. A sample item from Rotter’s scale 
asks, “Which statement do you agree with more? A. Many of the unhappy things in 
people’s lives are partly due to bad luck. or B. People’s misfortunes result from the 
mistakes they make.” 
After collecting basic demographic information, participants were asked to read 
some brief scenarios about courageous situations. For each scenario, participants were 
asked to either imagine themselves as the protagonist of the stories or to assess the 
courage of a third party protagonist of the stories, while paying careful attention to the 
actions taken, the reasons for doing so, potential dangers, and outcomes. Participants 
were then asked to rate how courageous they thought the protagonist was in the situation 
on a 10 point Likert scale (0 = not at all and 9 = as much as I can imagine), along with a 
series of questions regarding the story and assessments of courage. This approach 
allowed for different attributional perspectives for each participant, both internal and 
external. Participants imagining themselves in situations acted as the self-
oriented/internal attribution condition while participants assessing others’ courageous 
 
 
Call it courage  
28 
 
scenarios rated the other-oriented/external attribution condition. Finally, participants 
completed the social desirability, locus of control and humility scales. 
Data Analysis 
Following data collection, a number of analyses were conducted. First, descriptive 
statistics were collected for the participants, to examine mean ages, education, ethnicity 
and military experience. Data was sorted and split in order to look more closely at the 
various factors present within the scenarios; scores were compiled and categorized by 
courage type, risk level, and nobility level in addition to the original responses. Second, 
correlations were conducted for the additional scales of humility, social desirability and 
locus of control, where they were compared to the ratings given by. Scores were then 
compared between the military and civilian samples, to see if ratings were significantly 
different between the two. Correlations were run on the scenario ratings for courage, risk, 
meaning and goodness, and compared amongst themselves and the outside measures to 
look for potential relationships. Multiple ANOVAs were conducted to look at the 
between-participants variable of sample (military or civilian) and the within groups 
differences of attribution (self or other perspective) in addition to the various factors of 
courage type, nobility level and risk level. Additional post-hoc tests were conducted for 
results indicating relationships.    
Results 
Descriptive Statistics 
Means and standard deviations were within reported norms for the humility, 
social desirability, and locus of control scales. See Table 3 for means, standard deviations 
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and coefficient alphas for each scale. Note particularly the extremely low alpha for the 
humility scale, suggesting it is a weak measure in terms of reliability. Table 4 contains 
means and standard deviations for all scenario questions (Appendix C): courage and 
courage type ratings, as well as ratings for risk, goodness, meaning and ease of imagining 
both self and others. Additionally, normality and heteroscedasticity were both measured, 
and were found to meet assumptions.  
Courage Components 
 To assess the effectiveness of the scenarios, manipulation checks were included in 
the participant survey. Based on Rate’s (2010) definition, scenarios were also rated on 
risk, meaningfulness, and goodness. Correlations were conducted between these ratings 
(see Table 7) Means and standard deviations can be seen in Table 4. As Rate’s definition 
suggests, each of these components was a strong predictor of courage.  
A 2 x 2 ANOVA was conducted for each of the courage components, where 
sample (military versus civilian) and attribution (self versus other) were tested using 
participant ratings. For risk, a significant main effect was found (F(1,190) = 6.43, p = .01; 
see Figure 3), showing civilians rating scenarios as more risky than the military. Both 
attribution (F(1,190) = .16, p = .69) and an attribution by sample interaction (F(1,190) = 
.30, p = .58) had no significant results. 
Goodness was significant for a sample by attribution interaction effect (F(1,190) 
= 4.43, p = .036; see Figure 4) such that civilians rated goodness higher for scenarios 
describing themselves, while military participants rated goodness higher for scenarios 
describing others compared to scenarios describing themselves. Both sample (F(1,190) = 
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1.99, p = .16) and attribution (F(1,190) = .73, p = .39) were nonsignificant for goodness 
ratings.  
Meaningfulness saw no significant main effects (maximum F(1,190) = .617, p = 
.43) or interaction (maximum F(1,190) = 1.64, p = .2). 
Locus of Control 
Combining both samples, locus of control had no significant correlations. There 
was no significant relationship with courage (r= -.022; n = 189; p = .76). Correlations 
with additional scenario question ratings of risk, goodness, and meaningfulness were not 
significant (maximum r = -.076; n = 189; p =.30), nor was locus significantly correlated 
with the various types of courage (maximum r = -.115; n = 189; p = .12). When 
inspecting the difference between the military and civilian samples (see Table 6), there 
was a significant correlation for civilian participants between locus of control and 
courage ratings for other-based scenarios (r = -.259; n = 105; p = .008), but not the self- 
based scenarios (r = -.025; n = 106; p = .80). The military did not see this effect for either 
attribution (maximum r =-.050; n = 84; p = .65). The correlations between military and 
civilian locus of control and self-based scenarios were significantly different from one 
another (z = 2.12; p = .02).  H2 – that greater internal locus of control would lead to 
greater ratings of courage – was supported only for civilians in other-based scenarios.  
Humility 
 Humility was not significantly correlated with courage ratings (r = .119; n = 191; 
p = .10). Humility was also not significantly correlated with the additional scenario 
question ratings of risk, goodness and meaningfulness (maximum r = .096; n = 191; p = 
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.19), nor was it significantly correlated to the various types of courage (maximum r = 
.124; n = 191; p = .09). This is likely a result of the low reliability of the scale. Though 
reported values of Cronbach’s alpha were relatively high, in this analysis the calculated 
alpha was .275. Checking the corrected item-total correlations found to items with 
markedly lower correlations; using the 13-item scale, and scoring by sample all failed to 
appreciably increase the scale’s reliability. Further analyses were not performed on 
humility because of this scale’s low reliability. 
H3 – that greater humility would be correlated with greater courage ratings – was 
not was not testable with the current humility scale given its low reliability 
Social Desirability 
Combining both samples, social desirability did not significantly correlate with 
courage ratings (r = -.096; n = 190; p = .186). Social desirability had no significant 
impact on the difference between imagining ratings (r = .069; n = 190; p = .34) nor the 
difference between self and other courage ratings (r = -.107; n = 190; p = .144). When 
looking at the differences between military and civilian ratings there was no significant 
correlation for attribution (maximum r = -.050; n = 84; p = .65). 
However, when looking at courage based on type, there was a pair of significant 
correlations. Both moral (r = .175; n = 192; p = .016) and psychological (r = .171; n = 
192; p = .018) courage were generally rated slightly higher by those with higher social 
desirability scores (see Table 5). Ratings of physical courage scenarios was not 
significantly correlated to social desirability scores (r = .058; n = 190; p = .42).  
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H4 – that social desirability would increase self scenario courage ratings – was 
supported only for psychological and moral courage.  H5 – that social desirability would 
increase the distance between self and other ratings – showed no significant difference 
between these ratings and is not supported.  
Interrelationship of Locus of Control and Social Desirability  
Nothing was hypothesized about the relationships between the additional scales, 
and Table 5 presents these correlations. There was one interesting significant correlation. 
Locus of control had a significant negative correlation with social desirability (r = -.339; 
n = 189; p < .001). When compared by sample (see Table 6), this relationship was 
consistent in both the military (r = -.303; n = 84; p = .005) and civilian samples (r = -
.259; n = 105; p = .008).  
Courage Ratings 
Although results were in the predicted direction for H1, the self-other attribution 
effect was only marginally significant within participants. A 2 (Attribution: Self vs. 
Other) x 2 (Sample: Military vs. Civilian) ANOVA found a non-significant main effect 
trend of Attribution on courage ratings in the predicted direction (F(1,190)=3.00, p=.08, 
see Figure 2) where imagined scenarios about the self were rated marginally less 
courageous than actions read about others. There was no interaction effect 
(F(1,190)=1.19, p=.28), but there was a significant main effect of courage between the 
military and civilian samples (see Figure 2), in the same direction for both the self and 
other conditions: civilians routinely rated courageous acts higher than did the military, 
despite the scenario protagonist (F(1,190)=6.75, p=.01). H6a – that military service 
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would decrease ratings of courage for the self based scenarios – was supported. H6b – 
that military service would increase ratings for other based scenarios – was not supported. 
Like H6a, the relationship was the same: military service reduced courage for both 
attribution conditions compared to the civilian sample.  
Nobility Level Scenario Differences 
When considering the nobility of an action, military and civilians rated differently 
once more: a 2 (high versus low nobility) x 2 (self versus other attribution) x 2 (military 
versus civilian sample) mixed-design ANOVA on courage ratings found significant main 
effects for nobility (F(1,183) = 340.31, p < .001), where high nobility scenarios received 
higher ratings, and sample (F(1,183) = 8.72, p = .004), where civilians rated the scenarios 
higher than did the military. These were modified by a significant interaction effect for 
nobility and sample (F(1,183) = 9.77, p = .002) such that in high nobility scenarios the 
military was more strict in labeling acts as noble: their ratings were lower than were 
civilians. Means and standard deviations can be seen in Table 8; Figure 5 shows the 
differences in courage ratings between levels of nobility and attribution.  
Risk Level Scenario Difference 
The role of high and low risk scenario levels in perceiving courage also played a 
large part. An ANOVA was conducted, based on a 2 (high versus low risk) x 2 (self 
versus other attribution) x 2 (military versus civilian sample) mixed design. There was a 
main effect for sample (F(1,185) = 9.03, p = .003), where civilian courage ratings in high 
and low risk scenarios were greater than military ratings. There was also a main effect for 
risk level (F(1,185) = 236.99, p < .001) where high risk scenarios saw greater ratings than 
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low risk scenarios. A triple interaction was also found between sample, risk level, and 
attribution (F(1,185) = 4.24, p = .04), where civilian ratings in high risk level scenarios 
had an effect in the self-condition. High risk situations are perceived as more courageous. 
Civilians were more likely to rate a high risk act as more courageous than were the 
military when reading about someone else in a courageous scenario. Attribution had a 
marginal significance (F(1,185) = 2.50, p = .12) and no other tested relationships were 
near significant levels. See Table 9 for means and standard deviations and Figure 6 for 
the differences in courage ratings between levels of risk and attribution. 
Courage Type Scenario Differences 
Finally, the scenarios were broken down by type of courage using a mixed-design 
ANOVA, comprised of 3 (moral versus physical versus psychological types of courage) x 
2 (self versus other attribution) x 2 (military versus civilian sample). Here, there was a 
significant main effect for type of courage (F(2,270) = 99.17, p < .001), such that ratings 
for each type were significantly different from one another. Physical courage was rated 
highest (M = 6.85; SD =1.6), followed by moral courage (M = 6.45; SD = 1.9) and 
psychological courage (M = 5.15; SD =2.1). Main effects were found for sample 
(F(1,135) = 5.23, p = .02), such that civilians (M = 6.42; SD = 2.4) rated each type of 
courage higher compared to the military (M = 5.89; SD = 2.3), and for attribution 
(F(1,135) = 6.48, p = .01) such that other scenarios (M = 6.27; SD = 1.8) received greater 
ratings of courage than did self scenarios (M = 6.02; SD = 1.8), were also found. When 
controlling for type of courage, the marginal differences for attribution became 
significant differences, giving support to H1. There were no significant interactions.  
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A follow-up 2 (sample) x 2 (attribution) ANOVA was performed for each type of 
courage. See Figure 7 for differences in courage ratings for courage type. Physical 
courage was significant between samples (F(1,186) = 5.16, p = .02) such that civilians 
rated physical courage scenarios higher than the military. Physical courage was not 
significant for attribution effect (F(1,186) = .565, p = .43). Moral courage was significant 
for both sample (F(1,167)=3.77, p = .05), and attribution (F(1,167) = 7.31, p = .01). 
Civilians rated moral courage scenarios higher than did the military. Moral courage self 
scenarios saw lower ratings than did the other-based scenarios. Psychological courage 
was not significant (maximum F(1,170) = 1.79, p = .18). 
Post Hoc Analyses 
Further analysis revealed a significant difference between military and civilians 
with regard to how easily they can imagine themselves in the scenarios (see Figure 8 and 
Table 4). Here, there was an interaction effect between sample and attribution (F(1,190) 
= 3.77; p = .05). Compared to the civilian participants, the military participants had an 
easier time imagining themselves or others in the other-condition. There was no 
significant effect for sample (F(1,190) = .98; p = .32) or attribution (F(1,190) = .002; p = 
.97). 
 To determine that military and civilian differences were not an age effect but 
rather a result of military exposure, separate analyses containing only the 18-24 military 
sample (n=37) were conducted. These analyses compared the younger military sample to 
the entire civilian sample, and had results in the same direction as the full military 
sample. This indicates that age is not solely responsible for the military/civilian rating 
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differences, and that the professional culture does have some effect, even in limited 
exposure.   
Discussion 
Courage Components 
 The correlations found between the different ratings of scenarios were all very 
strong, further supporting the relationship between how courage is perceived and the 
importance of risk and nobility. While risk was assessed by a single item (“How risky 
was this action?” see Appendix C) nobility was assessed by two separate questions (How 
good was this action?” and “How meaningful was this action?” see Appendix C), hoping 
to get at some of the different aspects of nobility. Unfortunately, no question asked about 
nobility directly – future studies might wish to use this as an item as well, especially for 
determining whether proposed scenarios of high or low nobility match up cleanly to 
perceptions of nobility. Still, these items worked for comparing levels of risk and nobility 
between ratings of courage. The high relationship between courage ratings and the risk 
and nobility ratings shows both that these are important parts of courage as well as 
suggesting that the scenarios did an adequate job of encompassing these values.  
Hypotheses 
H1: There was significant effect for the attribution effect in the predicted direction 
when controlling for type of action, so H1 is supported. Courage ratings for others were 
often higher than for ratings of themselves, as is predicted with the phenomenon of 
courage blindness. When tests were run independently for each type of courage, the self-
other difference was only significant for moral courage scenarios. The influence of 
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attribution perspective on courage ratings did appear, and with further study and a larger 
sample, this trend could be expanded into a significant effect. The attribution main effect 
for moral courage was not present for physical or psychological courage (Figure 7). This 
was a surprising result, as it was assumed the attribution effect would be present for all 
types of courage or none of them. Instead, the difference suggests some interesting 
considerations for moral courage.  
Perhaps the nature of moral courage makes it more susceptible to the Actor-
Observer asymmetry (Jones & Nisbett, 1971). One difference between physical and 
moral acts of courage hinges on threat of physical risk. Physical courage is more risky 
than moral courage and the data reflects this (see Figure 7). Extreme physical risk might 
influence ratings between perspectives, because obvious situations of courage involve 
this sort of risk and in turn require higher ratings. Moral courage, by contrast, does not 
include physical risk as a requirement in all cases. Rather, it might be social or status 
risks that an individual is taking. This may not translate quite as well, and as a result, 
does show a difference between actor and observer. This difference in perspective could 
stem from differing views on what a “risky” act is, and whether or not to define an action 
as risky. For the self, the risk is undermined because of the nobility or goal; for others the 
risk is played up, as they might more easily see repercussions. Since others are in fact the 
ones judging an action based on courage, this seems to make sense. There could simply 
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Physical courage is the normal conception of courageous acts, but it involves 
commendation of physical acts, many of which take place in extreme circumstances. 
Ratings of courage for these acts could be closer together between the self and other 
conditions because they are less likely to occur, and the distinction matters less. 
Commendable acts of moral courage might be more approachable: they are less risky and 
more likely to occur for the average person (e.g. standing up to a bully or confronting 
someone cutting in line). Participants may have been more willing to rate other-condition 
scenarios as more courageous because of a familiarity or desire to see more acts of moral 
courage in their daily lives.  
Alternately, in line with Malle’s (2006) research, the moral courage could be seen 
as a more idiosyncratic and distinctive action, in that these actions challenge social norms 
where physical acts do not. Physical courage, while commendable, may not elicit the 
same sort of response that moral courage does because it falls more neatly into society’s 
definition and is seen as more “commonplace”. Imagining saving a child from a burning 
building might not elicit the “self-other” response because it is undoubtedly courageous. 
This approach would look more closely at the nobility factor of courage. The high level 
of nobility could be negating any difference between attributions: regardless of the actor, 
the act is brave and overcomes the blindness effect. In a less noble situation this effect 
does not impact the ratings because there is room for discussion about the actual level of 
nobility. It would be interesting to see a more detailed study focused on a more varied set 
of morally courageous acts and more detailed participant responses regarding the nobility 
and risk of the scenarios.  
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At the same time, psychological courage does not seem to have the same level as 
support as either physical or moral courage; it has less recognition as a type of courage 
(see Figure 7).  The lack of difference between self and other attribution conditions may 
have been a result of this lack of familiarity. Because psychological courage is not readily 
recognized as a type of courage, the distinction made between actors was not a factor.  It 
is hard to distinguish whether mental fortitude or treatment-seeking behaviors are 
courageous, and the lack of distinction between the attribution groups reflects this 
thought process. Should an individual be rated as courageous because they sought 
treatment for their own mental illness, or possibly even their mental weakness? There is 
again the room for maneuverability in interpretation, but in this case the notion of 
psychological courage appears to be more nebulous. It seems that in this study the moral 
scenarios hit a healthy medium that led to this effect, avoiding the popularity of physical 
courage and the unfamiliarity of psychological courage. 
H2: Locus of control found only one significant correlation with courage ratings 
of other-based scenarios. This finding shows support for the second hypothesis of greater 
courage ratings for internal locus of control, albeit only for a single attribution. The 
participants with high internal locus when reading scenarios about others may have been 
influenced by their mindset of being able to enact change on their environments. The 
other-based scenarios allowed for them to imagine a character who was acting to better 
their immediate surroundings, and they gave higher courage ratings accordingly. The 
suspension of disbelief may have been lifted when imagining themselves in the scenarios; 
though they belief in their ability to control their environment, they were not actually 
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doing anything and would not consider themselves courageous. For external locus 
participants, the opposite was likely true. In their other-based scenarios, they may have 
seen the actors as less courageous because they were simply in the right place at the right 
time. 
The idea that an individual’s beliefs about control could possibly affect their 
perceptions of courage is an interesting one, and could be an area of potential further 
study. Though non-significant, the trend of external locus to lower courage ratings does 
raise an interesting question regarding the necessity of volition for courageous acts. For 
example, a person walking down the street who has a baby fall into their arms lacks any 
active decision to be courageous. Rather, the event simply occurred. Of course, an 
outsider might not recognize the lack of volition (and thereby consider the act 
courageous) while the individual actor would likely not. This hearkens back to Rate’s 
(2009) finding of intentionality as a defining feature of courage. Like those with an 
external locus of control, he might believe he simply ended up in the right place at the 
right time and had no personal influence over the events taking place. Oliner’s anecdotal 
interviews (2009) for courage accolade winners show this attitude for many of the 
recipients: they do not consider themselves courageous, but fortunate to have been where 
they were, when they were. From the other side, those with an internal locus of control 
might find themselves more willing to rate themselves courageous, as they are willing 
actors in a situation they can affect. A study which looked exclusively at the differences 
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  H3: Unfortunately, the alpha of the scale was very poor, which suggests that this 
is not a particularly reliable result or measure. Without more study and a more reliable 
scale it is difficult to tell whether this relationship is relevant. The difficulty stems from 
the different conceptions of humility; creating a scale which takes these different views 
into account is extremely challenging. Elliot’s (2010) humility measure tried to do too 
much with its various subscales. Instead of focusing solely on downplay of ability or an 
accurate self-assessment approach, incorporation of both was attempted, resulting in a 
scale that has trouble pulling apart the various subcomponents and merging them into a 
cohesive rating. 
H4: Results did not show any significant relationship between social desirability 
and courage ratings, though additional analyses did see significant correlations with both 
psychological and moral courage. This was not an anticipated result, but it is an 
interesting one. Foremost, the lack of a relationship with physical courage suggests an 
understanding on the part of the participants that courage of that sort is heavily weighed 
by risk rather than social convention. However, psychological and moral courage do 
heavily depend on social situations, so it makes sense that those more inclined to be 
looked upon favorably would rate these scenarios higher. Moral and psychological 
depend on changing social cues and interpretations of morality in culture, but physical 
courage is not so dependent. The notion of physical courage has changed little in 
thousands of years, whereas these new models of courage are more recent. It could be 
that participants caught on to the difference between the more physical acts and the more 
social acts, and those higher in social desirability rated social courage higher, thinking it 
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to be the focal point of the study. Alternately, they may have identified more with the 
social aspect of these types of courage and rated them higher because of their familiarity: 
physical courage might have been less meaningful because of its relative rarity. 
H5: Social desirability did not have an effect on the difference between ease of 
imagining or attribution for courageous situations. This result was interesting, because of 
the revealed effect of social desirability on moral and psychological courage ratings. It 
would seem that if a relationship occurred for ratings of those scenarios, that participants 
high in social desirability might also want to portray themselves as more effective at 
imagining themselves in these situations or rating themselves higher for self-attribution 
conditions.  
  H6: The impact of professional culture on perceptions of courage is particularly 
interesting, though no hypotheses beyond the courage ratings were offered. What most 
bears mentioning is the consistent lower ratings for each of the fundamental parts of 
courage by the military – this was observed in nearly every condition. Civilians were 
consistently rating courage, goodness, risk, and meaning higher than servicemen would. 
This difference also supports the courage blindness effect. Because of their lack of 
involvement in a professional culture, they rated the different aspects of the scenarios 
more leniently. Meanwhile, military members - who experience greater risk and work 
within a professional moral code - had stricter ratings. Things which would normally 
seem heroic or risky from a normal perspective are seemingly mundane for the military. 
Civilians ranked nobility of an action significantly higher than did the military for low 
nobility scenarios, but the two were more in agreement for the high nobility situations 
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(see Figure 5). This supports the courage blindness effect: exposure to risky and 
courageous situations dull the effect these acts have on the individual performer, while 
still looking remarkable to outsiders. This disconnect between how courageous acts are 
perceived not only helps to account for the courage blindness effect, but also speaks to 
the respect which is so often given to members of the professional military. It would be 
interesting to see how this relationship changes a sample of those in a similar job with 
similar risk but less prestige – namely, mercenaries or guns-for-hire. Would they see a 
similar distinction in ratings because of the nature of the job, or would the lack of social 
support and celebration actually reduce their ratings?    
Interestingly, the only item for which military members scored higher was the 
question regarding ease of imagining oneself in the courage scenario. Servicemen, 
presumably familiar with the potential consequences of their careers and being 
committed to an organization requiring courage, found it easier to picture themselves in 
courageous situations. Again, those in the military find themselves in a position where 
they are normally called on to be courageous or noble and as such do not see it as a big 
deal. It is interesting to see how military members self-identify and find it easy to 
imagine themselves in situations which require courage; further research looking at this 
behavior might reveal how to increase this behavior or possibly even select for those who 
see courageous potential in themselves. 
Additional Findings 
The significant negative correlation between social desirability and locus of 
control was initially surprising; after checking the literature on the subject, it was found 
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to have been studied before, with similar results (Cone, 1971; Hodkinson, 2006). 
Essentially, those with a high internal locus of control feel that they have the power to 
affect change. In this fashion, they have no problem using socially desirable responses or 
actions. Similarly, those with an external locus of control care less about what others 
think, because they have a belief that there is little they can do to affect outcomes or 
change others’ behaviors. It is interesting to look at the relationship of courage to locus of 
control, and consider how the two are different. Courageous actors tend not to talk 
themselves up, while observers do tend to talk up courageous actors. The idea of an 
internal locus suggests that an individual is an agent of change and capable of influencing 
the environment. This would support a positive relationship with acts of courage, as the 
situation has presented an opportunity to have a significant and beneficial impact on the 
surrounding environment. The notion of having to do something because the actor was 
capable seems to fit here, and could account for the subsequent deferment of accolades. 
At the same time, an individual with an external locus might consider themselves to just 
have happened upon the right place at the right time and downplay their courageous act 
in that fashion. Alternately, they may decline to act at all, not seeing themselves as 
capable of remedying a dangerous situation. Regardless, there is some mechanism at 
work which causes dismissal of bravery; perhaps further study in this area can eke that 
mechanism out.  
Though weak, the positive correlations of social desirability to moral and 
psychological courage are intriguing. The relationship between risk and physical courage 
has been and ingrained into society: it is well established and accepted as a virtue. The 
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concepts of moral and psychological courage are relatively new and as such have not had 
as much time to develop in society. Individuals who are seeking to please others – 
particularly in the context of a psychological study – might recognize that aspects of 
courage beyond the physical are being studied and as a result bump up their scores for 
non-physical acts accordingly. The correlations are not particularly strong ones, so this is 
likely a non-issue for the current study. 
Limitations 
Because of the nature of this study, there were some limiting factors which could 
be remedied in future studies. First, only male participants were used in order to limit 
variability when responding to scenario questions. For the sake of simplicity, only males 
and male scenarios were used, thereby eliminating any variability that might have 
occurred between male-female, female-male, or female-female. A larger study with a 
greater scope might want to look at how these different combinations interact. Second, 
the randomization used to separate out the various scenarios was imperfect; as a result, 
participants could potentially have answered all imagine-self scenarios, but no imagine-
other scenarios. While this happened only a few times, it occasionally led to some gaps in 
the data, where there was no information for a particular participant because they only 
received one condition for that particular set of scenarios (e.g. the self-condition for all 
hi-risk scenarios). This is the reason for varying degrees of freedom for many of the 
analyses. An algorithm or manual system which balanced out these scenarios to ensure 
proper counterbalancing would be useful for future studies using this framework.  
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The military sample also had a lot of variation. It included ROTC cadets, 
veterans, and active-duty personnel. All of these subgroups have varying levels of 
experience, however, limited sample size forced an analysis with all of these groups 
together. In the future, a larger sampling of each of these groups might yield better results 
and information more specific to each of these groups. For example, research suggests 
that locus of control tends to become more internal with age (Heckhausen and Schulz, 
1995). The cadets, being younger, might have increased the average locus of control 
score for the sample and thereby decreased overall relationships. Cadets also had less 
experience with the military and may have answered questions from a more civilian 
mindset, as that is what they are more likely familiar with. The demographic statistics 
seem to support this (see Table 1) as cadets have no more than five years of experience in 
the military or any combat experience. 
One consideration which should be noted was the lack of any military scenarios. 
This study used only situations which could potentially be experienced by both samples. 
Because it is reasonable to assume that most civilians would not have exposure to these 
sorts of courageous acts beyond popular media, these sorts of scenarios (e.g. a military 
firefight) were excluded to avoid any speculation on the part of civilians (though it likely 
would have increased significance). Further study might want to include these sorts of 
scenarios for a military sample and compare them to the sorts of courageous situations 
portrayed in this study – a difference in courage ratings between these might reveal some 
insight into how the military perceives their own career.  
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Additionally, the humility measure was not particularly helpful in determining 
any significant relationships. This was a likely possibility given its recent development 
and the difficulty of creating a self-report survey on humility. If humility can be better 
understood at its most basic level or defined more consistently, then perhaps the scale’s 
validity can increase. As it stands, the nebulous nature of humility seems to be the 
limiting factor in the effectiveness of its study. With a more developed scale there may be 
opportunity for further study in this area in the future. One possible solution for 
improving self-report scales could be an initial set of questions intended to understand an 
individual’s definition of the term – perhaps even a qualitative answer which could be 
coded into different conceptions of humility. By separating out those who think of 
humility as being deferent or not speaking highly of themselves and those who consider it 
to be an accurate self-assessment of one’s abilities, separate questions could be 
administered for each humility “type”. Because of the presumed difference between each 
definition of humility, it seems reasonable to assume that item responses from supporters 
of each definition will score differently, thus allowing simpler comparisons and usage of 
humility data. 
Conclusion 
There is support for a courage blindness effect, and the military has higher 
standards for courage than do civilians. The latter should come as no surprise due to the 
professional culture of the military, the risks soldiers undertake, and the societal 
expectations and celebration of the military, but this sort of analysis has not seen much 
study and as such is relevant. The higher standard for courage that the military sets helps 
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explain much of the anecdotal evidence suggesting a courage blindness effect. This 
research could influence approaches on courage throughout the military. For example, in 
a clinical setting soldiers with PTSD often fail to see the courage they had while in 
combat (C. Pury, personal communication, April 16, 2012). By understanding that 
soldiers do have a higher standard for courage, it might be easier to reach out and explain 
that their deference is unnecessary. This research could also assist in awarding accolades 
for courageous action.  
Physical courage coupled with high risk is the current standard, but perhaps 
inclusion of differing types of courage could start a new trend. Military moral courage 
has a distinct separation from the civilian perception, according to this data. This 
separation makes sense when considering the physical risk inherent to military service, 
but is a bit more convoluted when considering moral courage. The significant moral 
courage data could indicate a higher threshold for morality or nobility from soldiers than 
civilians and be attributed to the professional culture or even perhaps the moral 
considerations necessary for becoming a soldier (e.g. the potential to take a life). Finally, 
the lack of significant data regarding psychological courage raises an interesting question 
of how the values of psychological courage are seen in the military and civilian 
communities. While mental health treatment seeking behaviors and mental fortitude are 
acknowledged to be good things, the possibility of stigma in mental health remains. A 
possible explanation for similar ratings could be the relationship of mental health 
treatment to psychological courage. More research courage blindness is necessary to 
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draw further conclusions, but at the very least, it does appear that courage blindness is a 
real phenomenon.  
 
 































Civilian Demographic Questions 
 
1) What is your age? _______ 
 
2) What is your ethnicity? _____________________ 
 
3) What is your highest level of education? ________ 
 
4) Do you have any prior or current military experience? Yes / No 
 
5) If yes, how many years have you served? _______ 
 
6) If yes, how much total time have you spent deployed? ________ 
 
7) If yes, what was your highest rank? ________ 
 
8) Do you have any prior experience in any of the following professions: police/law 
enforcement, fire-fighter, and emergency medical technician? Yes / No 
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Appendix B  
Courage Scenarios – Self 
1A: Physical/HN/HR) Imagine you are walking home, when you suddenly see and smell 
smoke from up the road. There is a home on fire, and you can hear shouts for help from 
inside the building. You run into the building, covering your mouth with your arm and 
coughing from the smoke.  Inside, you see the seven year old child who had been crying 
out, cowering in a corner. You pick the child up, and run outside to safety. Two minutes 
later, the building collapses. With the exception of a brief coughing fit, both you and the 
child are fine but you could have both easily have died in the fire. 
 
 2A: Physical/HN/LR) Imagine you are walking downtown when glance at the other side 
of the street. A stranger is being confronted very loudly by two shady looking characters. 
They appear to be getting up close and personal and the stranger looks scared. 
Immediately, you cross the street and greet the stranger as a friend. The two goons are 
startled by your interference and begin to walk away. As they leave, one turns around and 
shoots a dirty look at you. You and your new acquaintance immediately go to the police 
station to report the situation.  
 
3A: Physical/LN/HR) Imagine you are at the beach, when you hear a shout for help. A 
young child standing on the beach is pointing out to the water, where a toy is floating. 
Though you are not a strong swimmer and the waves are fairly tall, you run into the water 
and swim out to grab the toy. You manage to grab it and swim back onto the beach. You 
hand it to the child, who thanks you and walks away. It was not an easy swim, and you 
could have easily drowned. 
  
4A: Moral/HN/HR) Imagine you work at a Fortune 500 company, and have a stable, 
well-paying job which you enjoy. One day, while eating lunch in the break room, you 
overhear your boss talking about some illegal business practices. You have long 
suspected that some backroom deals are going on since your numbers have not added up, 
and this is an unquestionable admission of guilt. Despite great risk to your career in a 
poor economy, you contact the national office and report what you’ve noticed. 
 
5A: Physical/HN/HR) Imagine you are in a convenience store, looking for a snack.  
Suddenly, a masked person bursts into the store, yelling for everyone to hit the floor. 
There is no gun that you can see, but the person is holding a baseball bat. You haven’t 
been noticed behind the aisle, and you decide to act. You run up unseen and tackle the 
robber to the ground. You are able to pin the robber to the floor. Another customer, 
seeing you have stopped the thief, helps you. The cashier grabs the fallen bat, and calls 
the police. The robber is arrested shortly thereafter. 
 
6A: Moral/HN/LR) Imagine you are driving down the highway, when you suddenly see 
two cars collide in front of you. You pull over, unharmed, and see a dazed person exit 
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one of the vehicles. There is no one else around, and no one has gotten out of the second 
car. You pull over and immediately dial 9-1-1. After reporting the accident, you approach 
the second car. The passenger is awake but pinned inside, and there is no chance of 
removal. You talk to and keep the passenger calm until help arrives. The paramedics say 
that keeping the patient awake may have saved his life. It’s good that you were there. 
 
 
7A: Physical/LN/LR) Imagine you are out for a walk in the park. As you pass by a jungle 
gym, you hear a cry from somewhere nearby. You see a young child clinging to the top 
of a set of monkey bars. The child is unable to get down alone, and seems to be about to 
fall the four feet to the ground. You walk over, reach up, and catch the child. You place 
the child on the ground gently, who then runs to a nearby woman and tells her what 
happened. The mother, after hearing what you did, thanks you. 
 
8A: Physical/LN/LR) Imagine you are eating dinner with your family in your favorite 
restaurant. Suddenly, a stranger at the next table begins to choke. You have previous 
training in helping choking victims and know what to do. Jumping to your feet, you run 
around to the table and give a few abdominal thrusts. The hunk of steak is coughed up 
and the choking victim thanks you. The restaurant bursts into a spattered applause, and 
you carefully resume eating your dinner.  
 
9A: Moral/LN/HR) Imagine you come from a very socially conscious and active family, 
and have always been very involved and invested in politics. However, over time you 
have come to disagree with many aspects of your parents views, many of which 
correspond with political views. Your parents are staunch members of one party, while 
you now lean heavily to the other. They are not aware of your new political views, but 
you think that they would disapprove tremendously. You feel the need to let them know, 
despite the consequences. You sit them down and tell them about your new political 
views. They are incredibly disappointed and leave the room angrily. 
 
10A: Psychological/HN/LR) Imagine you are chatting with a relative when the 
conversation turns into an argument. The two of you hang up angry and without 
resolution.  Later that week, you hear that your relative has been in a car accident and has 
passed away. Because you last spoke angrily with that relative, you feel guilty. This 
eventually becomes a major issue – you have trouble sleeping and are often feeling down 
in the dumps. After a few months of bereavement and sluggishness, you decide to see a 
psychologist to help you get over. You realize that you will have to face your guilt and 
the painful memory of your relative’s death, but seek treatment anyway. Eventually, the 
guilt subsides and you are able to move on. 
 
11A: Psychological/HN/HR) Imagine you are at the bank to run some errands. As you are 
standing in line, three masked bandits brandishing guns enter and tell everyone to lie 
down on the floor. After removing your money and jewelry, you are corralled into a 
corner with the other patrons and bank employees. The robbers escape, but are eventually 
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caught a few weeks later. Despite being unharmed physically, you begin to experience 
bad nightmares, often feel on-edge and begin to have trouble interacting with others. You 
decide to see a psychologist, who diagnoses you with Post Traumatic Stress Disorder, or 
PTSD.  Though you will have to face some terrifying memories of your hostage situation, 
you follow through. After some therapy sessions, you are able to manage your fear and 
things return to normal. 
 
12: Moral/LN/LR) Imagine you are at home reading a book, when the telephone rings. 
It’s an old friend - one whom you have not seen or spoken with in ten years - with a 
proposition for you. Your friend has recently come into a number of high end electronics, 
and wonders if you’d be able to store them for a few weeks. This seems suspicious to 
you, so you ask where they came from. Your friend skirts the question, again asking for 
your help. Despite being an old friend, you refuse to help. After yelling and cursing at 
you, the phone is hung up with a slam. 
 
13A: Psychological/LN/HR) Imagine you are piloting an airplane, cruising tens of 
thousands of feet above the ocean. You have to fly directly through a thunderstorm. 
Everything seems to be fine, but suddenly the plane lurches and begins losing elevation. 
The passengers begin to clamor at the turbulence, but are unaware of how bad things are 
in the cockpit. The plane is quickly getting out of control. You, however, have trained for 
this and remain calm. Using your knowledge and experience, you eventually ease the 
plane back onto course and through the storm. The passengers cheer, unaware of how 
much danger they were in. Thanks to your mental resilience and calm demeanor, you 
managed to save the plane from crashing. 
 
14A: Psychological/LN/LR) Imagine you are a contestant on a low-stakes local game 
show, competing for a prize of 500 dollars. After several turns of shifting positions, you 
enter the final round. You are currently in second place, not far behind the leading 
contestant. The host looks to you and your opponent, and reads the quiz question off of 
his card. You know the answer! You hit the buzzer first and the host looks to you for an 
answer. Though you are nervous beyond belief, you remain calm and clearly state the 
correct answer. The lights flash, bells sound, and you are 500 dollars richer, thanks to 
your composure.  
 
 








0 = Not at all    9 = most imaginable 
 
1) How courageous was this action? 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
2) How risky was this action? 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
3) How good was this action? 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
4) How meaningful was this action? 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
5) How easily can you imagine yourself performing this action? 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  
 
6) How easily can you imagine someone else performing this action?  
 










32-item Humility Scale 
Please circle the response that most accurately describes you. 
1= Strongly Disagree 2= Disagree 3=Uncertain 4=Agree 5=Strongly Agree 
1. When it seems like God is ignoring my prayers, I become frustrated. 1 2 3 4 5 
2. I enjoy spending time reflecting on the majesty and power of nature. 1 2 3 4 5 
3. It is easy for me to accept the honest criticism of a friend. 1 2 3 4 5 
4. When asked I can give an accurate assessment of my personal strengths. 1 2 3 4 5 
5. I often spend time thinking about my personal inadequacies. 1 2 3 4 5 
6. When I have put myself out for another, I want them to acknowledge my sacrifice. 
    1 2 3 4 5 
7. I often feel bad for wanting more, when so many have less than me. 1 2 3 4 5 
8. The challenges ahead of me often cause me to feel overwhelmed. 1 2 3 4 5 
9. When asked to do something I usually think of others who are more qualified. 1 2 3 4 5 
10. During times of prayer/meditation I reflect on areas in my life where I need                                                          
I     improvement. 1 2 3 4 5 
11. When someone else is being recognized, I think about my accomplishments. 1 2 3 4 5 
12. I feel honored when others ask for my help. 1 2 3 4 5 
13. I often struggle with being selfish. 1 2 3 4 5 
14. Compared to the greatness and vastness of the universe I feel so insignificant.1 2 3 4 5 
15. It frustrates me, when others are praised and I am not. 1 2 3 4 5 
16. I don’t have my act together the way I’d like. 1 2 3 4 5 
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17. Recently, I have felt ashamed of my arrogance. 1 2 3 4 5 
18. I often wish I was as talented as my peers. 1 2 3 4 5 
19. When I don’t know an answer, I get upset because I think I should have. 1 2 3 4 5 
20. I get angry with know-it-alls. 1 2 3 4 5 
21. When I see inspiring examples, it reminds me of what I could be. 1 2 3 4 5 
22. When confronted with my mistakes, my first response is to explain why I did it.  
       1 2 3 4 5 
23. I am deeply touched when others sacrifice for me. 1 2 3 4 5 
24. It is hard for me to accept others’ praise because I am far from perfect. 1 2 3 4 5 
25. It irritates me when people below me don’t fulfill their responsibilities. 1 2 3 4 5 
26. I feel valuable doing “lowly” things for others. 1 2 3 4 5 
27. When friends ask for my counsel, I feel like “why me”? 1 2 3 4 5 
28. When I get in trouble, it is important to me to be able to explain what happened.  
       1 2 3 4 5 
29. I try to downplay my part when I help others. 1 2 3 4 5 
30. Death usually reminds me how needy I am. 1 2 3 4 5 
31. When I have been confronted with the reality of death, it causes me to think how 
quickly life passes by. 1 2 3 4 5 
32. I am usually quick to rationalize my failures. 1 2 3 4 5 
(Reverse score items: 1, 5, 6, 11, 15, 19, 20, 22, 24, 25, 28, 29, 32)  
 
 




33 item Social Desirability Scale 
 
Listed below are a number of statements concerning personal attitudes and traits. Read each 
item and decide whether the statement is true or false as it pertains to your personally. It’s 
best to go with your first judgment and not spend too long mulling over any one question.  
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12. There have been times when I felt like rebelling against people in authority even though I 







































Call it courage  
60 
 
















































Call it courage  
61 
 















29 Item Locus of Control Scale 
 
1. a. Children get into trouble because their parents punish them too much. 
    b. The trouble with most children nowadays is that their parents are too easy with them. 
 
2. a. Many of the unhappy things in people's lives are partly due to bad luck. 
    b. People's misfortunes result from the mistakes they make. 
 
3. a. One of the major reasons why we have wars is because people don't take enough interest 
in politics. 
    b. There will always be wars, no matter how hard people try to prevent them. 
 
4. a. In the long run people get the respect they deserve in this world. 
    b. Unfortunately, an individual's worth often passes unrecognized no matter how hard he 
tries. 
 
5. a. The idea that teachers are unfair to students is nonsense. 
    b. Most students don't realize the extent their grades are influenced by accidental 
happenings. 
 
6. a. Without the right breaks one cannot be an effective leader. 
    b. Capable people who fail to become leaders have not taken advantage of their 
opportunities. 
 
7. a. No matter how hard you try some people just don't like you. 
    b. People who can't get others to like them don't understand how to get along with others. 
 
8. a. Heredity plays the major role in determining one's personality. 
    b. It is one's experiences in life which determine what they're like. 
 
9. a. I have often found that what is going to happen will happen. 
    b. Trusting to fate has never turned out as well for me as making a decision to take a 
definite course of action. 
 
10. a. In the case of the well prepared student there is rarely if ever such a thing as an unfair 
test. 
      b. Many times exam questions tend to be so unrelated to course work that studying in 
really useless. 
 
11. a. Becoming a success is a matter of hard work, luck has little or nothing to do with it. 
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12. a. The average citizen can have an influence in government decisions. 
      b. This world is run by the few people in power; there is not much the little guy can do 
about it. 
 
13. a. When I make plans, I am almost certain that I can make them work. 
      b. It is not always wise to plan too far ahead because many things turn out to be a matter 
of good or bad fortune anyhow. 
 
14. a. There are certain people who are just no good. 
      b. There is some good in everybody. 
 
15. a. In my case getting what I want has little or nothing to do with luck. 
      b. Many times we might just as well decide what to do by flipping a coin. 
 
16. a. Who gets to be the boss often depends on who was lucky enough to be in the right 
place first. 
      b. Getting people to do the right thing depends on ability. Luck has little or nothing to do 
with it. 
 
17. a. As far as world affairs are concerned, most of us are the victims of forces we can 
neither understand, nor control. 
      b. By taking an active part in political and social affairs the people can control world 
events. 
 
18. a. Most people don't realize the extent to which their lives are controlled by accidental 
happenings. 
      b. There really is no such thing as "luck." 
 
19. a. One should always be willing to admit mistakes. 
      b. It is usually best to cover up one's mistakes. 
 
20. a. It is hard to know whether or not a person really likes you. 
      b. How many friends you have depends upon how nice a person you are. 
 
21. a. In the long run the bad things that happen to us are balanced by the good ones. 
      b. Most misfortunes are the result of lack of ability, ignorance, laziness, or all three. 
 
22. a. With enough effort we can wipe out political corruption. 
      b. It is difficult for people to have much control over the things politicians do in office. 
 
23. a. Sometimes I can't understand how teachers arrive at the grades they give. 
      b. There is a direct connection between how hard 1 study and the grades I get. 
 
24. a. A good leader expects people to decide for themselves what they should do. 




Call it courage  
64 
 
25. a. Many times I feel that I have little influence over the things that happen to me. 
      b. It is impossible for me to believe that chance or luck plays an important role in my life. 
 
26. a. People are lonely because they don't try to be friendly. 
      b. There's not much use in trying too hard to please people, if they like you, they like you. 
 
27. a. There is too much emphasis on athletics in high school. 
      b. Team sports are an excellent way to build character. 
 
28. a. What happens to me is my own doing. 
      b. Sometimes I feel that I don't have enough control over the direction my life is taking. 
 
29. a. Most of the time I can't understand why politicians behave the way they do. 
      b. In the long run the people are responsible for bad government on a national as well as 
on a local level.  
 
 



























Cadets 18 21 (0)* 2.8 (1.5) 0% 0 (0)* 0 (0)* 0% 
Enlisted 22 32.6 (9.1) 9.7 (6.6) 70% 2.1 (1.9) 18.2 (17.5) 48% 
Officers 45 N/A** 11.4 (8.2) 56% 2.1 (2.4) 9.7 (11.8) 36% 
*All reported ranges were the same. **Military participants were provided with age 
ranges. 
 
Table 2. Courage Scenario Factors 
 
 Courage Type 
Attribution Physical Moral Psychological 
Self HN LN HN LN ail HN l LN 
 HR(x2) HR HR HR HR HR 
 LR LR(x2) LR LR LR LR 
Other    HN LN HN LN HN LN 
 HR(x2)  HR HR  HR HR  HR 
 LR LR(x2) LR LR LR LR 
 
Note. HN=High Nobility, LN=Low Nobility, HR= High Risk, LR=Low Risk  
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Table 3. Humility, Social Desirability, and Locus of Control 
Means and Standard Deviations 
  Sample 
Measure  Military Civilian 
 α m(sd) n m(sd) n 
Humility .275 97.57(6.75) 85 98.19(6.24) 106 
Social Desirability .744 18.38(4.92) 84 15.08(4.44) 106 
Locus of Control .810 8.56(3.96) 84 10.79(3.90) 105 
 
Table 4. Courage Scenario Means and Standard Deviations 
  Sample    
Measure Military  Civilian   
 m(sd)  m(sd) t p 
Courage Ratings (all) 5.97(1.71)  6.54(3.90) 2.60 .01 
  Moral Courage 6.21(1.95)  6.65(1.79) 1.61 .11 
  Physical Courage 6.51(1.73)  7.11(1.41) 2.69 .01 
  Psychological 
Courage 4.99(2.27) 
 5.28(1.91) .94 .35 
Risk Ratings 5.45(1.61)  5.95(1.12)* 2.54 .01 
Goodness Ratings 7.15(1.17)  7.39(1.17) 1.41 .16 
Meaning Ratings 7.21(1.19)  7.20(1.26) -.04 .97 
Imaginability of Self 
Performing Action 6.79(1.41) 
 6.31(1.24) -1.75 .08 
  Self-described Actor 6.70(1.59)  6.59(1.36) -.51 .61 
  Other-described 
Actor 6.87(1.48) 
 6.31(1.39) -2.70 .01 
















Table 5. Correlation Table for Courage Types, Social Desirability, LOC and Humility 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1.  Courage Ratings -       
2.      Moral Courage Scenarios .069 -      
3.      Physical Courage Scenarios .068 .608** -     
4.      Psychological Courage Scenarios .050 .583** .539** -    
  Other Scales        
5.      Social Desirability Scores -.096 .175* .058 .171* -   
6.      Locus of Control Scores -.022 -.078 -.047 -.115 -.339** -  
7.      Humility Scores .119 .097 .124 .054 -.062 .071 - 
*  p < .05. ** p <.01. 
Table 6. Sample-based Correlations for Attribution Courage Ratings and Scale Scores 
 Civilian 1 2 3 4 
1. Courage Rating (self scenarios) -    
2. Courage Rating (other scenarios) .616** -   
3. Social Desirability Score -.025 .019 -  
4. Locus of Control Score -.049 -.259** -.249** - 
 Military  1 2 3 4 
1. Courage Rating (self scenarios) -    
2. Courage Rating (other scenarios) .682** -   
3. Social Desirability Score -.044 -.050 -  
4. Locus of Control Score -.058 .050 -.303** - 
 Sample Comparison  z p 
1. Courage Ratings (self/other) .77 .22 
2. Locus of Control / Self Attribution .03 .49 
3. Locus of Control / Other Attribution 2.12 .02 
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Table 7. Courage Component Correlations 
   1 2 3 4 
1. Courage  -    
2. Risk  .845** -   
3. Goodness  .750** .651** -  
4. Meaning  .712** .623** .916** - 
** p < .01 
Table 8. Courage Component: Nobility Courage Rating Means and Standard Deviations 
    Sample     
 Military Civilian Overall   
Measure m(sd) n m(sd) n m(sd)   n   
High Nobility 6.90(1.63) 86 7.25(1.38) 106 7.09(1.50)  192   
Low Nobility 4.91(2.10) 86 5.84(1.60) 106 5.42(1.89)  192   
 
 
Table 9. Courage Component: Risk Courage Rating Means and Standard Deviations 
    Sample     
 Military Civilian Overall   
Measure m(sd) n m(sd) n m(sd)   n   
High Risk 6.64(1.59) 86 7.18(1.37) 105 6.94(1.49)  191   













Figure 1. Age Ranges for Military Sample. Most military participants were between 18 
and 24 years of age, due to the inclusion of cadets. 
 
Figure 2. Bar chart of differing values for courage ratings between military and civilian 
samples for self and other attributions. Other courage ratings were slightly higher than 
self ratings, though this was non-significant (F(1,190) = 3.00, p = .08). The difference 



















































Figure 3. Bar chart of the differing values for risk ratings between military and civilian 
samples for self and other attributions. Civilians routinely rated scenarios as more risky 
than did the military (F(1,190) = 6.43, p = .01). 
 
Figure 4. Bar chart of the differing values for goodness ratings between military and 
civilian samples for self and other attributions. There was an interaction effect for ratings 
of courage based on attribution and sample F(1,190) = 4.43, p = .036) where goodness 
was rated higher by civilians than the military for the self-condition only. 






























































Figure 5. Bar chart of the differing values for courage ratings in high and low nobility 
scenarios between military and civilian samples for self and other attributions. Ratings 
between high and low nobility scenarios were significant (F(1,183) = 340.31, p < .001)  
as were courage ratings between samples (F(1,183) = 8.72, p = .004). Ratings between 
high and low nobility also interacted with sample, where differences were only 
significant for low nobility scenarios sample (F(1,183) = 9.77, p = .002). 
 




































Figure 6. Bar chart of the differing values for courage ratings in high and low risk 
scenarios between military and civilian samples for self and other contributions. There 
were significant differences between high and low risk scenarios (F(1,185) = 236.99, 
p<.000), as well as for military and civilian samples (F(1,185) = 9.03, p = .003). 
Additionally, a 3-way interaction occurred between sample, attribution, and risk level, 
where courage ratings increased for civilians reading high risk self-attribution scenarios. 




































Figure 7. Bar chart of the differing values for courage ratings for the moral, physical and 
psychological types of courage between military and civilian samples for self and other 
attributions. Civilians always ranked courage higher than military (F(1,135) = .5.24, p = 
.02). The other condition was also always rated higher than the self condition, though it 
was only significant for moral courage (F(1,161) = 7.37, p = .007). 




































Figure 8. Bar chart of the differing values for the difficulty of imagining oneself or 
someone else between military and civilian samples for self and other attributions. There 
was a significant interaction effect between attribution and sample (F(1,190) = 3.77, p = 
.05). Military participants had an easier time imagining themselves in the other attribution 
condition than did civilians. This was the only analysis where the military had 
consistently higher ratings than civilians. 
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